STATE, MARKET AND CIVIL SOCIETY

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF COMBINING THEIR DIFFERENT LOGICS

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0. INTRODUCTION

WHAT ABOUT STATEHOOD AND DEMOCRACY IN A TRIADIC MODEL OF SOCIAL ORDER?

Reading the papers for the workshop on “Changing relations among market, state, and civil society” as it had been held in the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, autumn 2017 and going through the impressive encyclicals “Caritas in Veritate” and “Laudato Si’”, the picture of a basic consensus takes shape. Stefano Zamagni has called it in his contribution to the debate (and in this book) “a triadic model of social order”. The basic idea is, that modern societies depend on the kind of relationships between market economies, society and statehood. This statement is made in a normative perspective that could be acclaimed around the world, across nations, regions, cultures and religions. It is the quest that such a social order could be seen as just to the degree the logics of the different sectors – market competition, social cooperation and state command can be brought into a well working and fair balance.

The ground-breaking encyclicals referred to above underline, that a mutual intertwining which gives human values a real impact as well within the market sphere cannot be done through the state alone. It needs active contributions from the social networks and associations of the civil society, organized in manifold forms of associations and communities that may reach from family networks to cooperatives. Zamagni (in this book) states, that a state is needed that “benevolently redistributes according to some criterion of fairness” in order to safeguard that associations of the civil society can do more than organising charity to the poor and excluded, while leaving enough room for the contributions of markets and the organised civil society. In this perspective the linkage between the contributions of the civil society and the state become a key concern. Pier Paolo Donati (2015 and in this book) has repeatedly criticised what he calls the “lib-lib-compromise”, combining the rival ideologies of libertarianism and liberalism on the one and of the socialist (labour) testimony on the other hand, with a dualistic model prevailing, operating by the interdependency and mutual limitation of state command and provision or market rules and commercialism.
Against this dualism Donatis’ concept of a relational state and other similar analyses and proposal of a “welfare mix” (Evers 1990) or a “mixed economy of welfare” basically call for acknowledging active contributions from the civil society and changes in the way welfare-state action has to be conceived.

However, these new ways to describe the role of the state as a welfare state within a triadic social order raise questions about social and political participation, the character of statehood and its relations to society and markets. They lead to the key question of this contribution: What are the political forms, kinds of links, action and institutions that can pave the ways to welfare within such a cooperative perspective? These topics usually get discussed as questions of democracy.

Taking a global perspective, it cannot be taken for granted that state redistribution and services get along with democratic institutions. Some kind of rules, redistribution and services may come as well from autocratic and authoritarian regimes. However, Armatya Sen (1982) has convincingly shown that only in democratic societies extreme forms of hunger could be avoided. Hence, concepts of a just triadic order must address not only questions of welfare but as well questions of democracy and of a statehood, wherein democratic values and processes can be firmly institutionalised.

Two waves of social and popular movements have in the last decades underlined the importance and urgency of this task.

On one side, broad social movements reaching from ecological to gender, from protests against exclusion to civil rights issues have with their quests for extending democracy into social spheres and working life, for new kinds of micro-solidarities and productive self-organisation have challenged concepts of a cold individualistic „lib“ (see: Milbank/Pabst 2016), fairly indifferent to inequality and concepts of a „we“; but they have challenged as well the „lab“ of a protective uniform and centralised state-welfare. Here concerns with welfare and sustainability are intertwined with quests for a more participatory democracy.
On the other side, the present new populist movements promise to revive a more protective social model by removing much of the “lib” that was embodied in pluralism and liberal democracy. Their practices of connecting directly personal leadership and masses take advantage of the weakening of the traditional bonds and intermediations between those in power and those that get governed as they have been brought about by the rule of technocratic and party elites (see: Crouch 2004). The authoritarian kinds of populism act not in the name of reconstituting a pluralism lost but of substituting one type of leadership by another one, close to the “real people”. They promise to regain social protection by the construction of a closed society that ought to be a kind of community.

So what about concepts of democracy, statehood and forms of democratic struggles for power, something that entails but goes as well beyond welfare-(state) issues? Carlos Hoevel has in his contribution to the workshop (see in this book) argued, that a civil economy and a civil society need a “civil state”. According to his view, this civil state should differ from a kind of statehood that is in the field of economic policy and welfare provision marked by “technocratic elitism” and “clientilism”. But he warns as well not to give in to the temptations of a populism that claims power in ways and in a perspective that leave no room for pluralism and the traditional liberal elements of democracy such as the division of legal, representative and executive powers, the rule of law, respect for individual rights, freedom of association and opinion building. He insists on the value of those political-liberal elements of the lib-lab system that are not mere market-liberalism.

There are then open and urgent questions about the kind of statehood, democracy and building a power for change that could make a just triadic social order a more real utopia. Three of them will be taken up in the following chapters, focussing altogether on the links between a civil society and a democratic and civil statehood.
1. DEMOCRATIC STATEHOOD AND CIVIL SOCIETY

BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, TRUST AND MISTRUST

Beyond essentials such as the separation of powers, competing political parties and a universal and equal right to vote there are many different historical variations of democracies. They mirror the ways modern societies have attempted to organise themselves as civil societies at large and to relate party-politics and administrations on the one and the more or less “active” citizens on the other hand.

**Camps, pillars and corporatism. Historical forms of linking democratic statehood and the civil society**

The impact of active citizens and a civil society in democratic states is inconceivable without the development and roles of various associations referred to by the “organized civil society” label. Political democracies were by far the best ground and framework for the development of such an organized civil society and vice versa: a civil society that took shape helped to create stable democratic institutions that increasingly developed public responsibility and policies - especially in the broad field of welfare.

- The liberal tradition accentuated the role of civic organisations as watchdogs and furthermore it supported the organisation of commercial and professional lobbying.

- The labour tradition had always two strands – the more etatist one, that wanted to bring about social security and egalitarian services by the state and those (fabian, syndicalist…) traditions that developed out of need and pressure and out of conviction self-organised support and service structures in education health, housing, welfare.

- The catholic church but as well the protestants developed an own tradition somehow in between; their welfare associations and cooperatives were contrary to the socialist labour strand mostly more loyal to the autocratic class systems of the public authorities. But they did it with the perspective on a subsidiaristic social order of collective self-help -
a tradition, the present concepts of a triadic order should revisit and take up critically.

In most developed democracies and welfare states all currents aimed at creating a fairly strong bond between party politics and the activities of those organisations within society that they build or saw as their allies. The respective practices and strategies of linking politics inside the state institutions and the organized action of the respective organisations within society were stabilized by shared political creed and religious convictions and by the culture and milieus of these camps.

• In Sweden e.g. the concept of bringing together society- and state-building in a “peoples home”, was based on a cooperation of trade unions and peasant organisations and a respective party alliance; securing a wide-ranging social-democratic hegemony that did not exclude but integrate other actors, including the protestant state church.

• In the Netherlands, the system of “pillarisation” gave Calvinists and Catholics, Socialists and Liberals, some room to build their own universes of services and institutions - hospitals, newspapers and broadcasting associations under the roof of the state administration. The pillars rested on both, building services and influencing government politics.

• In Germany the system of corporatism worked in similar ways: the socialist and left camp created offers and membership organisations “from cradle to grave” – trade unions, consumer and housing cooperatives became powerful allies of the party, that saw these organisations as parts of its camp and as instruments that ought to secure a stable support that went far beyond voting.

This kind of cooperation and negotiation has often been criticised as a mere form of engrossing social actors but it gave as well some room for influence, and both conflict and agreements. Up until half a century ago, within and across the respective peoples´ home arrangements, “pillars” or camps, arrangements for state-society cooperation and divisions of responsibilities worked quite effectively in stabilizing and developing democracy and welfare.
The widening gap between state and society

This historical testimony has been sketched here in a way that sharpens the contrast to the later development and our present situation. The reasons for the weakening of that past cooperative alliances across the borders of state and civil society are manifold

• Religion and grand political tales such as that of socialism have increasingly weakened, especially as mobilisers for forms of active memberships

• Individualisation, increasing social, territorial and cultural mobility have corroded traditional forms of community and belonging such as associating for voluntary and civic activities by firm membership

• Central features of welfare like social security and services have by the various lib-lab compromises become ever more either a private market affair or a task of fully professionalised state politics or they have taken the form of social industries that mix these two components

In the 1970ties in much of the western world but as well in other regions a major historical wave then divided past and presence of organised civil societies. After decades of high political trust and low levels of civic activism, new social movements brought protest and a search for alternatives on the agenda. New themes came into focus: rights not as a perfection of social security for the members of a “middle-class society”, but as issues of minorities, disadvantaged groups and from different perspectives, such as questioning the gender contract on which the social systems built. As to the more local and everyday aspects of these changes, new words entered the public vocabulary such as “citizen initiative”, “project” and “network” This usually meant groups that took shape outside the established canon of organising (around the big parties, traditional mostly nationwide social and lobby organisation,); they were local, often time limited without firm formalized membership and took up issues concerning all aspects of (local) life reaching from the side effects of a planned new highway, the decay of a city quartier, over to ecological waste.
With respect to these items, being an active citizen, confronted with the establishment and technocratic decision-makers (rather than being left or right, trade-unionist or church-bound) was the increasing new reference that allowed to assemble across otherwise dividing lines. And over time it was political mistrust much more than trust that inspired action, something Rosanvallon (2008) has called “counter-democracy”.

This picture would however be incomplete without taking account of the changes concerning the role of political parties that became visible from the 1970ties onwards (see: Schmitter 2001). Since then up until recently in most established democracies one can observe a shift from the traditional kind of “mass party” to kind of party organisations that have become ever more part of the state and increasingly removed from society (Katz and Mair 2009). They are concerned with securing a social base that is resorting less to activists and more to effective modes of campaigning among distant and volatile voters. Up until today this has meant as well a waning of the former affective attachment that goes along with the combination of active citizenship and party membership.

The ambiguity of the present state-civil society divide

The developments and new state of things as they have been sketched here are deeply ambiguous.

On the one hand the - at that time - new social movements have created a political culture, where citizen associations, projects and advocacy groups of today insist on being not firmly aligned to any special party, the prescriptions of its program and the modes of action to be used there. Representatives of political parties and administrations have been forced to invent all kind of new intermediary instruments that reach from public participatory meetings over to referendums; beyond that, in the “souterrain” of state policies, kinds of consultations with the addressees as “co-producers” of such services have become common place; this can be observed in various sectors of public policies as they get managed by professionals and administrations (public health, urban development, education...).
On the other hand, the developments of the last decades may be read as well as signs of a decay of democratic political culture. Political parties that have lost much of their roots in society have increasingly taken resort to the technicalities of getting voters as they are used by business and marketing experts; on the side of the people, institutionalised proceedings of consultation get instrumentalised for the narrow interest of special clienteles; there are kinds of protest like internet “shit-storms” where civic attitude is missing; finally collective initiatives and projects of citizens are just gap-filling, often born out of resignation, giving up on receiving appropriate complementary action by politicians and administrators.

The growing distance between politicians and elites on the one and organized citizens on the other hand finally results in regressive forms of bridging: quite often one finds on the side of citizen groups a kind of clientelism, where the dependence from state funding gets mitigated by a creative opportunism that seeks to make the best out of the given choices for political ad hoc support. Furthermore, the weakening of common bonds, shared language and aspirations, such as a credible social and political project for a wider common good, have favoured “identity politics” (Lilla 2016) - group-specific concerns and sentiments and related single-issue campaigning for quick results get priority.

Combining the logics of state, market and civil society calls for new bonds and bridges

Those that do not want to simply live on with this state of things but are concerned with concepts for upgrading the rights, responsibilities and competences of the diverse forms of organized civil society have to answer hard questions. Good or bad - the culture of “big” and professional politics, party systems and administrations and the culture of the social ecology of the various social movements old and new, big and small, concerned with advocacy and resistance or with building services and social support are in many ways interdependent. There is a need for new bonds between civil society and state politics. Since there is no way back to the stable camps and kinds of corporatism of former time - what might be then blueprints with some future-oriented value?
The field of questions for research and debate in that direction is much wider than those about welfare and a different civil and not-for profit economy. They are about concepts of democracy and political participation as they concretize in the links between a civil society and the political administrative state-system, the intermediary capacity of political parties on the one and civic organisations on the other hand:

- What could be the contributions of civil society organisations, not only in terms of reliable self-organised services, but as well as elements in the process of decision making and public opinion building, as factors of resistance and of pushing for renewal and change?

- What about the acknowledgement of that new generation of fairly small local organisations and initiatives that do not take the forms of well organised kind of service and lobby groups?

- What about the citizenship rights of organisations that act as critical forces and watchdogs – e.g. rights for formal complaints before a court?

- Will political parties beyond media campaigning and image building find back to ways of being socially rooted and to make alliances with civil society groups?

- How then could a culture of mutual recognition and “conflictive cooperation” look like? Can something be learnt from new forms of urban governance as they have been described by Barber (2013)?

The very aim of getting nearer to a just triadic order means that a different and as it is suspected bigger and better contribution of the organised civil society cannot be reached without changes in the culture and orientation of democratic state politics as we know it. Resocialising party politics and politicising the concerns that get articulated in the civil society depend on each other. The apparent similarity but as well the deep difference to the populist agenda is to be found here.
2. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AS HYBRIDS

A NOTION THAT SHOULD COVER MORE THAN CONCERNS WITH WELFARE PROVISION

Many discourses about the role of the civil society with respect to state and market and as well the discourses that stem from the historical encyclical “Quadragesimo Anno” on subsidiarity, concentrate on the potential of organisations in the civil society that are not-for-profit, rivalling or complementing the goods and services from the market sector or the (welfare) state. Present attempts to understand them have led to the notion of “hybrid organisations”. Putting it in simple terms, hybrids mix and intertwine features that are mostly separate, be it on the level of organisations or of sectors wherein similar foundational rationalities prevail.

Inter-sectoral hybridity - a way of combining state, market and civil society logics in welfare organisations

Be it the state, the market, the civil society or the sphere of communities - in all of these sectors elements and rationalities of the other can have some presence. The logic of action and the organisational forms to be found there may be to some degree co-shaped by those of others. Hybridity entails as well, that there is much diversity in those zones where one finds state, market, civil society and community overlap: there may be, for example, different degrees of community links in the worlds of markets or contributions of local associations to public services. The impact of market rules such as profitability may be tamed by the embeddedness of enterprises into a local community; public services, their standards and rules and their degree of being built into a hierarchical state logic may differ due to the impact of local forces, priorities and histories; the grip of communities on the tasks and obligations of their members may be counterbalanced to some degrees, where markets give a possibility to opt out or citizenship rights break community rules.

This view on the distinctiveness of sector logics that however allows as well for kinds of mutual blurring is often taken on the theoretical basis of the new institutionalism (see: Friedland and Alford, 1991) that conceives organisations as units that make up for kinds of domains and sectors,
sharing a logic that is dominant in the respective field: the logic of hierar-
chical command and redistribution in the state sector, the logic of compe-
tition and for profit orientation in the market sector, the logic of cooperati-
on within the civil society and the logic of personalised commitment in the 
realms of community.

With respect to civil society organisations the notion of hybridity points 
to a conceptual model that defines this sphere by its pluralism and ways 
of linking orientations such as free association, solidarity and civic action 
with a shot of values dominating in the other sectors, such as administrati-
ve professionalism, the search for profits in competition, or the cultivation 
of bonding ties. In one way or another the intermingling of these norms 
has over time lead to forms of organizing and action that represent kind 
of inter-sectoral compromises. Evers (2005) has observed three dimen-
sions of hybridisation. The first of these is concerning the hybridisation 
of resources; it involves mixing not only material and financial resources 
such as market income or state grants but also those that stem from the 
social capital of trust relationships and civic commitment. The second di-
mension is related to the intertwining of sector-specific goals and steering 
mechanisms: of public good and group specific local orientations, of state 
regulation and self-regulation, brought in by the participation of various 
stakeholders from the civil society. A third dimension is related to kinds of 
a many faceted corporate identity as its had historically taken shape by 
cooperatives or mutuals and presently is often expressed in labels such 
as “social enterprise” and “social entrepreneurship”.

Hybridisation by widening the dominance of state and market logics 
in society at large

Looking back to history one can state that the prevalence of the histori-
cal lib-lab model of welfare democracies, focussing respectively on the 
power of state and market, had its counterparts in widening their logics 
– mostly at the expense of civil society and community logics, forms of 
action and organizing.
On the lab side this meant to see civil society based organisations and services in welfare often merely as forerunners of or nudges for establishing firm state based offers. All the more important were then those concepts that were based on catholic social thinking in terms of subsidiarity, looking for limiting the states’ role to a subsidiary function, taking over in those cases, where institutions such as the family, the community or associated self-help came to their limits.

On the lib- side there has always been the tendency to reduce the role of state institutions to a kind of control or financing of private marketed services, the institutionalisation of kind of social markets for welfare goods. The liberal imaginary tends up until today to see not-for-profits just as another kind of enterprise.

In both perspectives civil society based forms of cooperative and solidaristic action were to have a residual role in spheres, where it was and is difficult for state and market based offers to reach in. People are seen in the lib-lab concept of welfare and democracy basically as consumers and voters and hardly as (co)producers.

The kind of hybridisation that has historically resulted from this has been an increasing role of either state or market rationalities within many civil society organisations that contribute to welfare. Etatisation can mean hybridisation in terms of a high impact of state based standards and financing, governance and goal setting. Marketisation has meant to put voluntary organisations, charities and other civil society based organisations increasingly into the framework of market rules, denying that their different tasks and orientations should get acknowledged by special rules.

These historical shifts due to changing discourses on wealth and welfare and the aims of state and market actors for solidifying and extending their fields of operations have been theorised as processes of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) – a kind of creeping hybridisation of organisations in the weaker sectors by taking over the rules and logics of the stronger ones. Hybridisation would work then by coercive, mimetic or normative modes of adaption and assimilation.
In a way, this theoretical concept may lead to the pessimistic clue, that finally kind of state-market combinations increasingly eat up forms of civil society and community organising. The ways in which many civil society organisations have been tied into subcontracts with state-agencies that focus on their service performance instead of receiving support by grants that leave to them to co-decide on their social mission has weakened their impact as advocates for what could be called a “vision based approach”; it makes them getting ever less interested (or less forthright) in campaign work (Aiken 2013)

While one can find much empirical evidence for such processes one may observe however as well counter-tendencies towards a kind of hybridisation that takes the opposite direction. There are new organisations emerging within civil society and moreover, solidarity and commitment by volunteering or civic action, movements and ideas that have an impact within state and market organisation: public schools may be co-shaped by parents organisations’ and the pressure of environmental NGOs may spill over to the rules in commercial organisations, being forced to present themselves as “corporate citizens”. This results then in forms of hybridisation that are about strengthening civil society and community logics not only in a “civil society sector” but as well in some places of state and market sectors. A wave of publications on co-production in social services has tried to demonstrate that state-public services could profit from support associations of the users, enriching their resources and participating in decisions over their design (see here: Boivard/Löffler 2013). Hybridisation can then represent the power of a civil society that pushes towards a more participatory and empowering style of public services, respecting peoples’ family and community bonds and being open to cooperative forms of interaction with individual and collective partners in the civil society.

However, if one wants to explain such kinds of hybridisation it will not be enough to look only at the soft power of mimetic processes and changing cultural orientation. One needs to look as well to the “coercive” dimension of power - be it the power of state and market organisation to force their ratio on others or the power of civil society organisations and movements
to invade state and market realms – not just by doing different but as well by explicitly claiming that this difference gets acknowledged.

Combining “saying” and “doing” – another kind of hybridity

For an understanding of the resilience of this third sector organisations facing pressures from market and state sides and their ability to penetrate into realms of the market and state, it is needed to point to another different kind of hybridity that has been called a “multipurpose”, or “functional” hybridity (see: Evers 2017).

Many organisations in the civil society, old and new, set out as their mission to uphold and promote cultural social and political values that are typically at variant with dominant and institutionalized values, especially when they are part of social movements; it is in relation to this, that they are offering services to members and the public that express distinct values, using services as a model and catalyst for social change. In addition to their instrumental goals in service provision, they aim to meet the expressive and social identity needs of their members by promoting a collective identity. Looking back into history one can find various ways to combine civic activism, volunteer-run association building and the creation of social services and mutual social support. Testimonies from today for such kind of hybridising different purposes can be found across continents and countries. “Build and resist” - that is e.g. the central slogan used by a network of social enterprises in Latin America. By an interrelating of civil society, social movement and non-profit sector studies, as it has been done e.g. by Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005), something gets visibility that is hidden, when the civil society realms are analysed in a way that studies civic action, social protest and a different kind of non-profit social service provision separately and not with a view to their interrelations. In many organisations, in networks and alliances in and across the civil society sector, one finds what Hasenfeld and Gidron have called “multi-purpose hybridity”, combining in various ways goals of value change, service provision, mutual aid and advocacy alongside with a deliberate mix of organizational forms borrowed from volunteer run associations, social movements and non-profit service organisations.
In consequence one can say that the chances and pitfalls of combining logics of state, market and civil society should not only be debated in terms of an inter-sectoral hybridising of welfare services and organisations. One should be aware of the fact that the vitality and impact of the civil society and community sectors to be brought into hybrid welfare arrangements depends on purposes and functions, as they are significant for civil society organisations – a multi-purpose hybridity, combining the building of supportive services with the cultivating of values and identities as well as with resistance, advocacy and campaigning.

3. DEMOCRACY ACROSS BORDERS

COMBINING STATE-BASED REFORMS AND CHANGE BY SOCIAL INNOVATIONS

It has been argued, that the goal of getting to a just order of state, market and civil society is a task that has a strong political component. Actors across the basic institutions of society have to find ways of regaining and strengthening democracy by linking anew state action with active forces in civil society, thereby overcoming a thin liberal concept of democratic government and withstanding populist temptations. In that context civil society organisations are important that are hybrids - not only because they are able to develop services and welfare arrangements that represent by their services better mergers and mixes of market, state and civil society logics, but as well insofar as they are able to combine this with advocating and campaigning for giving their concerns, goals and values more relevance across society at large.

Contributing to recurrent social innovation – An important potential of the civil society

Different and better welfare services however call for recurrent changes and inventions, kind of social innovations. In his address to the participants of the workshop on the changing relations among market, state and civil society, Pope Francis has used the nice picture of civil society as the younger of three sisters, that draws the other two, market and state, forward to what is new and better.
A way towards that have always been those innovations that did not come from market actors or administrators but out of the texture and networks of the civil society – social innovations that reached from new concepts like collective child care over to mutualist social insurance schemes. Both took shape as local and disperse social inventions before they became state concerns and translated into new rights, offers and standards.

It is as well in that perspective that one could argue that a more just “triadic” order does not only need to stay open to technological and market-based progress but as well to those requests and nudges from the civil society that take shape as social innovations. Johnson (2010) has drawn attention to the ways, the locus of “good ideas” in the last century has shifted from innovations that were the outcome of individual inventors and the R&D departments of big industries to social innovations that take shape in networks – within the civil society itself – e.g. by new forms and offers of personalised help, solidarity and cooperation that reach from urban gardening to new public health, from new forms of teaching and learning to community based support networks. (for an overview on such innovative initiatives and organisational forms in the European region see: Evers, Ewert and Brandsen, 2013)

Such social innovations intending to work for the public good may spring off locally in various settings, often in relation with social and cultural movements that are concerned with living conditions, lifestyles, sustainability and the strengthening of peoples’ capabilities. Like their predecessors, represented by housing cooperatives or mutuals, they have a double character, since they combine two elements (Evers and Brandsen 2015). It points back to the kind of multi-purpose hybridity discussed before. They represent solutions that have to work “here and now” but also involve “messages” about the wider concerns and utopias that activate the respective organisation and its volunteers / engaged professionals / social entrepreneurs. This gets visibility when looking at work integration social enterprises. While some of these initiatives may aim only at maintaining their local project, others look as well for ways of extending and solidifying the mission, networking with individual and corporate allies and hoping for sensibility and support from public state and municipal bodies or partners.
in the business sector. The nudges of projects and milieus that generate innovative services and try to promote wider aspirations and utopias, “acting local” and “thinking global”, constitute an archetype of multi-purpose hybridity.

**Mainstreaming social innovations**

This leads to the question of how to find ways for popularizing such innovations. While this can be done to some degree within civil society itself, it raises as well questions with regard to state-politics and welfare institutions. New kinds of social enterprises need a legal status, new solutions for social support need public co-funding; and at a certain point questions arise in which way the experience from such innovative “exceptions” could be used to change what is “standard” in public services.

However, so far there is a considerable gap between the established perception of social change, conceiving it in terms of state-based "welfare reform" and thinking in terms of social change by social innovation. So far the latter has hardly found yet a place in concepts for reforming education, health, welfare or energy politics. Many policy textbooks in fields such as welfare, health or education have a narrow focus on policies, debates and decisions on reforms within state institutions. Societal actors are brought in only through their role within social movements and pressure groups that try to influence the nature of state decisions on the respective institutions and offers – in other words by protest, negotiation and deliberation. Civil society and respective organisations, which contribute to new and innovative welfare arrangements not only through participation in the decision-making process, but also by creating and preserving all kind of services, are typically not mentioned. There is, therefore, a need to learn more about welfare as a history of social innovations and their mainstreaming.

The rich history of a social economy of invention, innovation and creation throughout Europe was not simply a forerunner of the ‘real thing’ in the form of state-based social security and service system; rather, it entailed a voluntary, not-for-profit and community sector that has, right up until the present day, included an important role for social innovation.
Therefore, when discussing potential links between social innovation and public politics, welfare mixes and relational concepts of state-contributions that are open for encompassing innovations from the various milieus in civil society should be seen as the appropriate framework of reference.

Moreover, strategies that want to give more space for social innovation have to rethink the kind of balance between equality and diversity as it prevailed in state-centred welfare concepts. In various ways, historical welfare policies have sought to ensure greater equality in society. It is generally agreed that all people should have access to the same institutions and facilities, whether in health, social support services or education. Standards should be guaranteed in both urban and rural areas and the same quality and procedural standards should ensure that this is always the case. This idea of equal provision was primarily linked with hierarchical systems of decision-making and administration. However, uniform and centralised school and health systems, as well as centrally regulated workfare services and the attitudes of their professionals typically allow little space for local deviance and innovation. The latter need institutional arrangements that give some space to do things differently. New offers and solutions often build on the specificity of local contexts and traditions, something that is frequently viewed with mistrust from a conventional welfare perspective, as well as by system managers. Balancing the need for standardised and uniform regulations with the space to experiment with something new and different are an important precondition of new relations between the state and the civil society.

**A policy of democratic experimentalism. Combining change through social innovation and public policies**

Dealing with social innovation calls for a new balance between change by comprehensive reforms and a policy of democratic experimentalism (Sabel 2001). Much policy making has traditionally been guided by the concept of building comprehensive institutions and regulations top-down. To be effective, therefore, social innovative concepts either have to make it to the top of political and professional elites that design far-reaching reforms or to find a niche at the margins. However, there has always been a second tradition in policy making that has gained in influence over the last
decade, especially at the local level: initiating change and paving the way for reform through time-limited state programs that take up an innovative model, support it for a limited time-span, evaluate the results and then decide on whether to roll out the reform in a longer-term and more far-reaching design. Across states and societies special model programmes have captured a key role in public policy making: trying out new methods of urban regeneration, family support, or occupational and social integration. A great many social innovations may become mainstreamed in this way. However, not all programmes succeed, different schemes reflect different concepts and priorities, and changes often remain incomplete. But does this diversity and incompleteness not in some ways reflect the needs of society better than the dream of an ultimate ‘grand design’? A metaphor may be found in the history of urban planning where the attraction of cities has to do with these kinds of overlapping and co-existence of attempts for partial renewing and repairing rather than with the often frightening attempts to construct completely new cities by following a single design logic throughout.

However, such ways of giving civil society based recurrent social innovations a place in ways of conceiving social and political progress leads back to the centrality of democratic politics and a somehow civil statehood to match the civil society. Innovatory changes to get impact need first of all a society that gives spaces and tolerates dissent and alternatives. Furthermore, innovators need public institutions, administrators, politicians and professionals that are willing to look, listen and learn. That entails a kind of pragmatism of “try and see”, the readiness, to experiment with new concepts and the experience that derives from that, rather than to make grand designs based on technocratic expertise only. And it needs platforms for dialogue, where the knowledge gained by new social and economic practices is worshipped by professionals and experts. Such institutional proceedings and attitudes might qualify the taking up of social innovations as a kind of democratic experimentalism that brings encompassing state reforms together with what one has learned by trying out new solutions.
4. IN CONCLUSION

RECONSIDER DISCOURSES ON COMBINING THE DIFFERENT LOGICS OF STATE, MARKET AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN A POST LIB-LAB CENTURY

Focussing on the relationships between state and civil society, this paper has aimed at three key points when it comes to reconsider discourses, i.e. concepts and strategies for combining the different logics of state, market and civil society in a post-lib-lab century. They are all addressing democracy, a term that should be part of the concerns of the church with a just kind of “triadic” order.

1. Reconsider the tasks of creating appropriate bonds between state-institutional politics and civil society movements and organisations in institutional settings that make liberal democracies more participatory. There is need for a kind of civil statehood that matches a civil society, when it comes to withstand both elitist and populist temptations.

2. Reconsider the strengths and peculiarities of civil society organisations, intertwining different logics, especially those of building support and services and of advocating and campaigning for peoples’ concerns – as it is addressed by a notion of “hybridity” that is sensible for this kind of “political economy” of civil society and its associations. The links and tensions in such kind of relational welfare should be seen as a fundamental part of bonds as discussed under (1.).

3. Reconsider the ways of getting to sustainable changes and the chances that open up in this respect by a better interplay of state-based reform and social innovations. Such kind of democratic experimentalism, concerned with achieving good balances of equality and diversity needs a new interplay of civil societies and democratic statehood.

Dealing with these tasks may encourage the “step forward in the direction of faciendum” – as it had been requested by the organisers of the workshop and debate in their invitation.


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